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https://github.com/MacRimi/ProxMenux.git
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Update AppImage
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MacRimi
@@ -997,3 +997,207 @@ pmx_ask_permanent_mount() {
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echo "false"
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fi
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}
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# ==========================================================
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# Inspect the filesystem behind a path inside a CT and report
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# which POSIX features it supports. Used by `samba_lxc_server.sh`
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# and `nfs_lxc_server.sh` to decide whether traditional
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# chown/chmod is enough, ACLs are needed, or the filesystem
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# (exFAT, FAT32, NTFS via fuseblk) supports neither — in which
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# case the only viable path is configuring the HOST mount with
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# `uid=`/`gid=`/`fmask=`/`dmask=` options.
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#
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# Args:
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# $1 = CTID
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# $2 = path inside the CT (e.g. /mnt/media)
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#
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# Echoes a single line with 4 tab-separated fields:
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# <fstype>\t<can_chown>\t<can_acl>\t<unprivileged>
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# where can_chown / can_acl / unprivileged are "yes" / "no".
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#
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# Sample outputs:
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# "ext4 yes yes no" → ext4 on privileged CT, full POSIX
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# "zfs yes no no" → ZFS without acltype=posixacl
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# "exfat no no no" → exFAT, no POSIX semantics at all
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# "ext4 yes yes yes" → ext4 on unprivileged CT (caller
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# must keep in mind chown from
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# inside is likely to fail anyway)
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# ==========================================================
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pmx_detect_share_target_caps() {
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local ctid="$1"
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local path="$2"
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# Filesystem reported by the kernel (NOT what fstab claims —
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# the actual mounted FS as seen from inside the CT).
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local fstype
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fstype=$(pct exec "$ctid" -- stat -f -c '%T' "$path" 2>/dev/null)
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fstype="${fstype:-unknown}"
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local can_chown="yes"
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local can_acl="yes"
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case "$fstype" in
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ext2*|ext3*|ext4*|xfs|btrfs|tmpfs|nfs*|cifs*|smb*)
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# Native POSIX. ACL is the kernel default for these.
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;;
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zfs)
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# ZFS supports chown natively, but POSIX ACL only when
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# acltype=posixacl. Probe with a no-op setfacl. We
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# ensure setfacl exists first; if not, install it.
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if ! pct exec "$ctid" -- bash -c "command -v setfacl >/dev/null" 2>/dev/null; then
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pct exec "$ctid" -- bash -c "apt-get install -y -qq acl >/dev/null 2>&1" || true
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fi
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if ! pct exec "$ctid" -- setfacl -m "u::rwx" "$path" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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can_acl="no"
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fi
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;;
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msdos|vfat|exfat|ntfs|fuseblk)
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# These filesystems do not carry POSIX ownership / mode
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# / ACL at all. Permissions come exclusively from the
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# mount-time options (uid=, gid=, fmask=, dmask=).
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can_chown="no"
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can_acl="no"
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;;
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*)
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# Unknown FS — probe both. We try chown to ourselves
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# (no-op when it succeeds) and a no-op setfacl. Both
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# are cheap and tell us what works.
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local cur_owner
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cur_owner=$(pct exec "$ctid" -- stat -c '%U:%G' "$path" 2>/dev/null)
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if [[ -z "$cur_owner" ]] || ! pct exec "$ctid" -- chown "$cur_owner" "$path" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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can_chown="no"
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fi
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if ! pct exec "$ctid" -- bash -c "command -v setfacl >/dev/null" 2>/dev/null; then
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pct exec "$ctid" -- bash -c "apt-get install -y -qq acl >/dev/null 2>&1" || true
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fi
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if ! pct exec "$ctid" -- setfacl -m "u::rwx" "$path" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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can_acl="no"
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fi
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;;
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esac
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# CT type — privileged (unprivileged: 0) lets chown / chmod
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# run as effective host root. Unprivileged CTs have a user
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# namespace mapping and chown from inside the CT typically
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# fails on host-side bind mounts.
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local unprivileged
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unprivileged=$(pct config "$ctid" 2>/dev/null | awk -F': ' '/^unprivileged:/ {print $2; exit}')
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local unpriv_flag="no"
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[[ "$unprivileged" == "1" ]] && unpriv_flag="yes"
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printf '%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n' "$fstype" "$can_chown" "$can_acl" "$unpriv_flag"
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}
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# ==========================================================
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# Configure ownership / permissions on a shared mountpoint so
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# the given Samba/NFS user can write to it. Branches by the
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# filesystem capabilities reported by pmx_detect_share_target_caps.
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#
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# Args:
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# $1 = CTID
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# $2 = mount point inside the CT
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# $3 = username inside the CT (must already exist)
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#
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# Returns:
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# 0 on success or partial success (warnings shown).
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# 1 only on hard failures the caller should refuse to proceed on.
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#
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# Expects the global helper `sharedfiles` group to already exist
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# in the CT (caller is responsible for that — see
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# setup_universal_sharedfiles_group).
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# ==========================================================
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pmx_setup_share_permissions() {
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local ctid="$1"
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local mp="$2"
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local username="$3"
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# Probe filesystem capabilities.
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local caps fstype can_chown can_acl unpriv
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caps=$(pmx_detect_share_target_caps "$ctid" "$mp")
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IFS=$'\t' read -r fstype can_chown can_acl unpriv <<<"$caps"
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msg_info "$(translate "Detected filesystem at $mp:") $fstype (chown=$can_chown, acl=$can_acl, unprivileged_ct=$unpriv)"
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# Always ensure the user is in the sharedfiles group — this
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# is harmless regardless of FS capabilities. Skip when no user
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# was passed (NFS path: only the group matters, no per-user ACL).
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if [[ -n "$username" ]]; then
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pct exec "$ctid" -- usermod -aG sharedfiles "$username" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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# ACL spec — include the user only when one is provided.
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local acl_spec="g:sharedfiles:rwx,m::rwx"
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if [[ -n "$username" ]]; then
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acl_spec="u:$username:rwx,$acl_spec"
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fi
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if [[ "$can_chown" == "yes" ]]; then
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# POSIX-friendly filesystem. Set group ownership +
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# setgid bit so new files inherit the group.
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if pct exec "$ctid" -- chown root:sharedfiles "$mp" 2>/dev/null \
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&& pct exec "$ctid" -- chmod 2775 "$mp" 2>/dev/null; then
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msg_ok "$(translate "Ownership set to root:sharedfiles with 2775 on:") $mp"
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else
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msg_warn "$(translate "chown/chmod failed — likely unprivileged CT against host bind mount. Falling back to ACL.")"
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fi
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if [[ "$can_acl" == "yes" ]]; then
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# Access + default ACL so new files clients create
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# inherit write permission for the sharedfiles group
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# (and the Samba user, when one is provided). Without
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# `-d` (default ACL) the parent's ACL doesn't propagate
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# to children → new files end up with restrictive 755
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# and clients get "permission denied" on the next write.
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# `m::rwx` keeps the ACL mask from clipping rwx grants.
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pct exec "$ctid" -- setfacl -R -m "$acl_spec" "$mp" 2>/dev/null || true
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pct exec "$ctid" -- setfacl -R -d -m "$acl_spec" "$mp" 2>/dev/null || true
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msg_ok "$(translate "POSIX ACLs applied (access + default for inheritance).")"
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else
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msg_warn "$(translate "Filesystem $fstype does not support POSIX ACLs — relying on group ownership only.")"
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if [[ "$fstype" == "zfs" ]]; then
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msg_warn "$(translate "Tip: zfs set acltype=posixacl xattr=sa <pool>/<dataset> enables full ACL support.")"
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fi
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fi
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else
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# exFAT / FAT32 / NTFS-fuse / similar — permissions live
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# entirely in the host mount options. Don't waste cycles
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# trying chown/chmod/setfacl; tell the user what to do
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# and refuse to silently produce a broken share.
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local uid_in_ct gid_in_ct
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uid_in_ct=$(pct exec "$ctid" -- id -u "$username" 2>/dev/null)
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gid_in_ct=$(pct exec "$ctid" -- getent group sharedfiles 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f3)
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msg_warn "$(translate "Filesystem $fstype does NOT support chown/chmod/ACL.")"
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msg_warn "$(translate "On a privileged CT the mount options carry the only permissions.")"
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msg_warn "$(translate "Stop the CT, unmount the disk on the HOST, and remount with:")"
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echo
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echo " mount -o uid=${uid_in_ct:-1000},gid=${gid_in_ct:-100},fmask=0002,dmask=0002 <device> <hostpath>"
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echo
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msg_warn "$(translate "Then update /etc/fstab on the host with the same options.")"
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msg_warn "$(translate "Recommendation: reformat the disk to ext4 for a robust setup — see docs.")"
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fi
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# Verify the user can actually write. `runuser` instead of
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# `su` — `pct exec ... su -` raises 'cannot set groups:
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# Operation not permitted' due to a PAM/cap quirk with the
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# exec entry path; runuser doesn't have that issue.
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# Skipped for the NFS path (no specific user to test as — the
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# NFS server itself decides UID mapping at export time).
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if [[ -z "$username" ]]; then
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msg_ok "$(translate "Directory configured for sharedfiles group access on:") $mp"
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return 0
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fi
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local has_access
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has_access=$(pct exec "$ctid" -- runuser -u "$username" -- \
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bash -c "test -w '$mp' && echo yes || echo no" 2>/dev/null)
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if [[ "$has_access" == "yes" ]]; then
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msg_ok "$(translate "Write access verified for user:") $username"
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return 0
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else
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msg_error "$(translate "Write access test FAILED for user:") $username"
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msg_warn "$(translate "Samba/NFS clients will likely receive 'permission denied'. Review the steps above.")"
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return 1
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fi
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}
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